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Political Economy, Civic Virtue,
and the Subjective World
of the Elite, 1780–1825
ANDREAS SCHÖNLE
It is well known that economic thinking became fashionable in the second half of the
eighteenth century in Russia.1  The Free Economic Society, founded in 1765, put the issue
of agricultural improvement on the agenda, conducted several international essay
competitions, and published proposals based on different economic theories in its journal.2
Middle-ranking landowners such as P. I. Rychkov and A. T. Bolotov wrote extensively on
agricultural matters, both from agronomical and economic standpoints, and published their
observations in periodicals.  Some elite landowners experimented with various agronomical
techniques, for example field rotations, and employed foreign bailiffs to supervise the
implementation of imported techniques.3  They also wrote about their alleged successes (or
failures), and a famous debate erupted between F. V. Rostopchin and E. R. Dashkova on the
import of new English practices and technologies.4
Research for this article was facilitated by a Leverhulme Trust research grant “The Creation of a Europeanized
Elite in Russia: Public Role and Subjective Self” (RPG-357) awarded to Andrei Zorin and myself.  I should like
to thank The Leverhulme Trust for their generosity in supporting this research.
1See Esther Kingston-Mann, “In the Light and Shadow of the West: The Impact of Western Economics in
Pre-Emancipation Russia,” Comparative Studies in Society and History 33 (January 1991): 86–105; as well as
Alessandro Stanziani, Bondage: Labor and Rights in Eurasia from the Sixteenth to the Early Twentieth Centuries
(New York, 2014), 23–31.
2Trudy Vol'nogo ekonomicheskogo obshchestva, 52 vols. (St. Petersburg, 1765–98).  The edition continued
in the nineteenth century.  For an analysis of the society see Colum Leckey, Patrons of Enlightenment: The
Free Economic Society in Eighteenth-Century Russia (Newark, 2011).
3Michael Confino, Systèmes agraires et progrès agricole: L’assolement triennal en Russie aux XVIIIe–
XIXe siècles (Paris, 1969) ; idem, Domaines et seigneurs en Russie vers la fin du XVIII siècle (Paris, 1963).
See also V. I. Semevskii, Krest'ianskii vopros v Rossii v XVIII i pervoi polovine XIX veka (St. Petersburg,
1888).
4[F. V. Rostopchin], Plug i sokha, pisannoe stepnym dvorianinom (Moscow, 1806); E. R. Dashkova, Mnenie
o pluge i sokhe (St. Petersburg, 1807).
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The debate extended beyond agricultural improvement.  Physiocratic ideas entered
Russia through the offices of D. A. Golitsyn, who was the Russian plenipotentiary in Paris
in the 1760s.  He had come into contact with the French “économistes” and advocated their
ideas in his letters to the vice-chancellor A. M. Golitsyn, which were read by Catherine II.5
Some of Adam Smith’s ideas were disseminated at Moscow University in the lectures of
I. A. Tret'iakov and S. E. Denitskii, who had studied at the University of Glasgow in the
1760s and attended Adam Smith’s lectures.6  One often forgets, however, that one of the
most articulate transmissions of liberal economic views, as opposed to mercantilism,
occurred on the pages of N. I. Novikov’s Pribavleniia k Moskovskim vedomostiam
(1783–84), which was distributed to the subscribers of the Moscow newspaper.  In it, among
other economic works, Novikov published a treatise known as “O torgovle voobshche,”
which had long been attributed to him, but was recently revealed to be a translation of K. A.
Schönfeld’s Essay on the Beneficial Impact of Trade on the State (1779).7  This ringing
endorsement of freeing domestic and international trade cites David Hume, Adam Smith,
Raynal, Montesquieu, Rousseau, and many others.  It foregrounds such basic ideas as the
division of labor; the economic stimulus created by new demands arising from the spread
of fine taste and a degree of luxury; the advantages of paper money and the need for available
credit; the moral transformation of citizens and rise of industriousness from participation
in economic exchange; the innovative offshoots of the pursuit of self-interest; the importance
of competition between citizens; the notion that, left alone, the economic system drives
toward a point of equilibrium between supply and demand through inflation (although it
does not refer explicitly to Smith’s famous notion of the “invisible hand” of the market);
and the call to reinvest capital into production.  This pamphlet also argues that despotic
countries are the least—and republics the most—amenable to the development of trade and
hence to the increase in wealth attendant on it.8  There is even a hint, in Novikov’s publication,
that the net result of trade is an enhancement of freedom.9
5Rossiiskii gosudarstvennyi arkhiv drevnikh aktov (RGADA), f. 1263 (Golitsynskii fond), op. 1, dd. 1111–
25.  Golitsyn’s De l’esprit des économistes, written and published after the French Revolution, reflects a more
moderate version of physiocratic ideas.  See D. A. Golitsyn, De l’esprit des économistes ou les économistes
justifiés d’avoir posé par leurs principes les bases de la révolution française (Brunswick, 1796).
6Anrep Anikin, Russian Thinkers: Essays on Socio-Economic Thought in the 18th and 19th Centuries
(Moscow, 1988), 40–52.
7The translation of Schönfeld’s Probschrift von dem vorteilhaften Einfluss der Handlung auf einen Staat
was republished in N. I. Novikov, Izbrannye sochineniia (Moscow-Leningrad, 1954), 507–61.  Source
identification by V. I. Simankov, Iz rasyskanii o zhurnale Pribavleniia k Moskovskim vedomostiam (1784–4),
ili ob avtorstve sochinenii, pripisyvavshikhsia N. I. Novikovu, I. G. Shvartsu i F. V. Karzhavinu (Khar'kov,
2010), available at http://www.imwerden.de/pdf/simankov_o_zhurnale_pribavleniya_1783-84_2010.pdf.
Unless otherwise noted, all URLs cited in this article were last accessed September 2, 2017.  For a discussion
of this edition see A. A. Kostin, “Divnyi novyi tsifrovoi mir, ili ob istochnikakh ‘Pribavleniia k Moskovskim
vedomostiam,’” Russkaia literatura (2011): 1, 75–94.
8Novikov, Izbrannye sochineniia, 536.
9Ibid., 535.  Although it is mentioned at the beginning of part 3, Novikov in fact omitted the last chapter of
the essay, devoted to freedom.  In it, the author argued that the blossoming of trade is necessarily tied to direct
and unfettered peasant ownership of the land, the absence of monopolies, personal security and security of
property, freedom of conscience, and a republican form of government.  The original is available at http://
gdz.sub.uni-goettingen.de/dms/load/img/?PID=PPN657496510|LOG_0001&physid=PHYS_0002.
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The government took a great interest in economic matters.  In its early years, Catherine
adopted some physiocratic principles in economic policy, fostering competition, destroying
monopolies, and adopting a flexible and moderately protectionist customs tariff in 1766.
An even more liberal tariff was introduced in 1782.  The Nakaz also incorporated some
physiocratic ideas, notably the emphasis on private property, and struck a middle ground
between freedom of trade and tariffs.  (More protectionist policies returned later in her
reign, in 1793.10)  In 1768, Catherine mandated the Academy of Sciences to organize several
expeditions to take stock of “what can contribute to the prosperity of the empire.”11  She
was particularly interested in the physical and economic geography of her dominions; that
is, in everything that concerns natural resources, agronomic practices, and industry.  The
expedition headed by Peter Simon Pallas became the most famous, but it was by no means
the only one.  In 1775, Catherine granted all classes including serfs the freedom to
manufacture, which greatly stimulated production.
By the beginning of the nineteenth century, liberal economics of a Smithian persuasion
was widely popular in the tsarist family and in government circles.12  Some of Alexander I’s
initial advisors, such as Admiral N. S. Mordvinov and V. P. Kochubei, were under Smith’s
direct influence.  The first Russian translation of the Wealth of Nations, commissioned by
Minister of Finance A. I. Vasil'ev, was published between 1802 and 1806.  Political economy
was also present in educational institutions.  The Riga-born and German-educated economist
Heinrich Storch taught first at the Cadet Corps School in St. Petersburg, before becoming
member and eventually vice-president of the St. Petersburg Academy of Sciences.  He
wrote a comprehensive economic analysis of the Russian Empire in the 1790s and went on
to publish a major treatise on political economy, acknowledged internationally, which was
influenced by Adam Smith, but proposed an alternative, broader definition of wealth.13
This brief survey only skims the surface.  Around the turn of the century the economic
literature published in Russia was both substantial and current, if not necessarily original.
Of course, local social and legal parameters sometimes compelled changes to the meaning
of imported works.  Thus in his preface, the translator of a text known in English as The
Rural Socrates by Hans Kaspar Hirzel—a tribute to a Swiss peasant praised for his
independence, self-discipline, rationality and obedience—enjoined Russian noblemen to
take example from this starkly rigorist paragon of human perfectibility, lest the reader think
this role model applied to serfs and implicitly argued for their emancipation.14  Nevertheless,
10Isabel de Madariaga, Russia in the Age of Catherine the Great (New Haven, 1981), 470–75; V. V.
Sviatlovskii, Ocherki po istorii ekonomicheskikh vozzrenii na zapade i v Rossii, vol. 1 (St. Petersburg, 1913),
217–22.
11Peter Simon Pallas, Voyages de M. P. S. Pallas en différentes provinces de l’empire de Russie, et dans
l’Asie septentrionale, 5 vols. (Paris, 1788), 1:iii.
12I. G. Bliumin, Ocherki ekonomicheskoi mysli v Rossii v pervoi polovine XIX veka (Moscow-Leningrad,
1940), 50.
13H. F. Storch, Historisch-statistische Gemälde des russischen Reichs am Ende des achtzehnten Jahrhunderts,
vols. 1–8 (Riga-Leipzig, 1797–1803); Heinrich Storch, Cours d’économie politique ou exposition des principes
qui déterminent la prospérité des nations (St. Petersburg, 1815).
14I. K. Girtsel, Sel'skoi Sokrat, ili opisanie ekonomicheskikh i nravstvennykh pravil zhizni filosofa-zemledel'tsa
(Moscow, 1789), 15.  The original publication came out in German under the title Die Wirthschaft eines
philosophischen Bauers (Zurich, 1761) and was translated into French in 1762 as Le Socrate rustique.  The
Russian translator, who developed a largely physiocratic argument, here writes about the “search for the true
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Russia shared in the explosion of political economic literature, which John Shovlin observed
in France and analyzed as a patriotic endeavor to “create a political community in which
citizens subordinated their private interests to the welfare of the public.”15
The question I wish to pose here, is whether in Russia, too, the rise of economic
thinking fostered a spirit of civic virtue, including an identification with interests of state
that transcended self-interest, and if, as Shovlin identifies in France, this went so far as to
be associated with republican ideas or some other notions of freedom.  While the influence
of the new political economy in government and academic circles is well documented, little
has been said on the broader impact of political economy on the nobility, especially the
upper nobility, which after all assumed important economic functions through the
management of its estates.  In his magisterial analysis of the economic practices of the
nobility, Michael Confino concluded that nobles and serfs by and large shared a mentality
of internalized traditionalism, rooted in structures of ownership and agronomical realities,
that made them suspicious of innovation.16  What Confino called a “marvellous interlocking”
of estate economy, rural society, and agricultural methods explains, in his account, why any
incremental change would have called into question the entire edifice of social relations in
imperial Russia and hence encountered considerable resistance.17  Confino’s premise that
nobles were inspired solely by a self-interested desire to increase revenue from their estates
was called into question by Elgar Melton, who demonstrated that “enlightened seigniors”
equally cared about the moral and economic well-being of their serfs, and indeed thought
that only by promoting the latter’s welfare could they hope to increase their own revenue.
In the instructions they wrote to regulate the management of their estates, enlightened
seigniors sought to establish a law-based system that would make the exercise of arbitrary
authority unnecessary, which allowed them to pursue their economic interest with a clear
conscience.  Their modus operandi was thus juridical more than economic, perhaps reflecting
cameralist ideas about a well-regulated system of government.  Tracy Dennison recently
demonstrated that the Sheremetevs granted considerable economic independence to their
serfs, as well as title to the land they tilled, although their system, too, was a legal-
administrative one and it is unclear what economic vision, if any, lay behind it.18  The
question thus remains whether the new economic theory likewise influenced the worldview
and practices of estate landowners.
By way of answering this question, I propose a close analysis of three case studies,
consisting of two members of the elite, Princess Natal’ia Petrovna Golitsyna and Prince
Ivan Ivanovich Bariatinskii, and a member of the middling nobility, Aleksandr Mikhailovich
Bakunin.19  My inclusion of Golitsyna is partly inspired by Michelle Marrese’s convincing
principles of public economy” (obshchestvennaia ekonomiia) and draws attention to the tight similarities
between the domestic economy and the government, so that Kliog (the idyllic Swiss peasant) is also presented
as a model for the ruler (Girtsel, Sel'skoi Sokrat, 18).
15John Shovlin, The Political Economy of Virtue (Ithaca, 2006), 5.
16Confino, Systèmes, 253–69.
17Ibid., 302.
18Tracy Dennison, The Institutional Framework of Russian Serfdom (Cambridge, England, 2011).
19This choice of figures has been dictated by the availability of archival records shedding light on their
subjective world, but it does not imply that this trio is exceptional or unique in their involvement with political
economy.
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argument that it was often women who managed the estates they owned themselves or on
behalf of their husbands.20  I define “political economy” broadly as concern with and
knowledge about the distribution and enhancement of wealth in the state (or in the realm of
a ruler).  Political economy is thus distinct from domestic economy, although in the case of
Russian serf-owning nobles, especially those commanding vast country estates, the
distinction begins to blur.  Nevertheless, the use of “political economy” serves to focus
attention on the tight interconnection between economic practices and issues of government.
It also offers an alternative to the focus in recent scholarly work on the country estate as a
privileged site for the invention of a new domesticity.21  My purpose is thus first to evaluate
the extent to which my three protagonists had assimilated new economic thought from the
Physiocrats to Adam Smith and what strand of economics they adopted; and, second, to
probe how (if at all) this economic thinking affected their worldview, feelings, values, and
behavior, in particular whether it shore up a sense of patriotic devotion to the well-being of
the state; that is, inspired a public commitment over and above their private interests as
landowners, in line with what Shovlin identified in prerevolutionary France.
A brief terminological note at the outset.  The Russian language enjoyed the availability
of at least four terms for economic matters, domovodstvo, domostroitel'stvo, khoziaistvo,
and ekonomiia, the first two being calques of the Greek etymology of economy (“oikos”—
house, and “nemein”—management).  Generally, domovodstvo and domostroitel'stvo were
more frequently used for the domestic or the estate economy (sel'skoe domostroitel'stvo),
while ekonomiia was more likely to apply to broader public matters and khoziaistvo could
apply to both.  Novikov used the concept of state economy (“gosudarstvennaia ekonomiia”)
in the 1783 translation “O torgovle voobzhshe” and so did I. I. Golikov in his biography of
Peter I in 1788.  The concept of politicheskaia ekonomiia itself is not attested until the
beginning of the nineteenth century—the admittedly incomplete Natsional'nyi korpus
russkogo iazyka lists Pushkin’s Roman v pis'makh (1829) as the first occurrence—but that
clearly does not mean that concerns now associated with the term “political economy”
were absent before.
N. P. GOLITSYNA, who is known as the prototype of Pushkin’s “Queen of Spades,” is the
author of Dnevnik moikh puteshestvii, a diary of her travel and stay abroad during the years
1783–90, in which she demonstrates sustained interest in matters of political economy.22
Born in 1744 in Berlin, the daughter of Petr Grigor'evich Chernyshev, a diplomat and then
senator, she spent much of her childhood in London and then Paris.  In 1766 she married
20Michelle Lamarche Marrese, A Woman’s Kingdom: Noblewomen and the Control of Property in Russia,
1700–1861 (Ithaca, 2002), 171–204.
21See, in particular, John Randolph, The House in the Garden: The Bakunin Family and the Romance of
Russian Idealism (Ithaca, 2007), 48–81, for an excellent analysis of Bakunin’s intentions from the perspective
of self-invention and the fashioning of domesticity.  For similar approaches to a somewhat later period see
Mary W. Cavender, Nests of the Gentry: Family, Estate, and Local Loyalties in Provincial Russia (Newark,
2007); and Katherine Pickering Antonova, An Ordinary Marriage: The World of a Gentry Family in Provincial
Russia (New York, 2013).
22Pushkin broadly based the character of the “Queen of Spades” on Golitsyna, but many of the key details of
the story are fictional.  See V. A. Mil'china, “Zapiski ‘pikovoi damy,’” Vremennik pushkinskoi komissii, vol. 22
(Leningrad, 1988), 136–42.
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the wealthy Vladimir Borisovich Golitsyn, who retired from the army three years later with
the rank of brigadier, by no means a distinguished achievement for a man of his social
background.  She took matters in her own hands, managing the family estates and overseeing
the education of her children.  She traveled abroad to supervise the education of her two
sons in Strasbourg.  Her two daughters followed along.  When Catherine expressed
displeasure at Golitsyna’s decision to educate her children in foreign lands, she claimed
that her husband’s ill health required a stay abroad.23
Her travel notes, Observations from My Travels, 1783–1790, written in lively French
albeit with deficient spelling, begin by relating the transformations she undertook in her
family estate of Kamarich in the Orlov province prior to departure.  Dissatisfied with the
peasant dwellings on this estate, both aesthetically and on pragmatic grounds (the fire risk),
she ordered the village rebuilt along a straight line, spacing out houses and taking down
fences on the roadside.24  She named the two main streets after the owners and also arranged
to lay out two decorative groves and build a stone church.  These actions evince both
rationalizing and aesthetic aspirations and are characteristic of her energetic management
style.  In an autobiographical account of her early life entitled Observations on the Events
of My Life, Golitsyna recounted two more instances in which she oversaw the reconstruction
of villages for her serfs.  She claimed to erect beautiful houses both for her peasants’
commodity and “for the arrangement of my view.”  The attempt to incorporate serf villages
into the aesthetic amenities of the estate was unusual for the times, as expenses were more
frequently funneled into improving the mansion and the gardens.  Lest the readers think
that she abused the manpower of her serfs, Golitsyna clarified that “I am running the
constructions at my own costs, so that my peasants would not feel any burden from the
move to a new place and would not complain that I initiated expenses that will wear them
down.”25  The dispositions she took in Kamarich also featured the construction of a large
mill and a distillery, suggesting that she intended to use serf labor to produce and trade
alcohol, a brisk source of income for enterprising nobles as well as a cause of much serf
exploitation.26  Having put her house in order, she embarked on her journey “with tears in
her eyes.”
As she travels through the Polish steppes, she comments on the poverty of peasants,
whom she considers to be much worse off than Russian serfs, and it is clear that she writes
as a Russian patriot.  In the parts of Poland then under Austrian control, she comments on
the tyrannical rule of Joseph II, who has no compunction to expropriate noblemen when he
23Stefan Lehr, “Vospitanie rossiiskogo dvorianstva: ot praktiki obrazovatel'nykh puteshestvii v zapadnuiu
Evropu k natsional'nym korniam kul'tury (semeistva Golitsynykh i Apraksinykh v 1780–1812),” Quaestio
Rossica 2 (2015): 160; E. P. Grechanaia, Kogda Rossiia govorila po-frantsuzskii: Russkaia literatura na
frantsuzskom iazyke (XVIII–pervaia polovina XIX veka) (Moscow, 2010), 158–59.
24N. P. Golitsyna, Remarques sur mes voyages, 1783–1790, Rossiiskaia gosudarstvennaia biblioteka, Otdel
rukopisei (RGB), f. 64 (Viazemy), karton 113, d. 1, l. 4.  A Russian translation of her diaries has appeared
recently, but as it contains several translation mistakes, I will refer instead to the archival original.  See N. P.
Golitsyna, Moia sud'ba—eto ia, ed. and trans. T. P. Peters (Moscow, 2010).  Translations into English are mine
throughout.  All dates are given in the old style.
25N. P. Golitsyna, Remarques sur des événements de ma vie, RGB, f. 64, karton 117, d. 1, l. 23ob.  Also in
Golitsyna, Moia sud'ba, 31–88 (quotation on p. 58).  For a discussion of Golitsyna’s writings and of her stay in
Paris see Grechanaia, Kogda Rossiia govorila po-frantsuzskii, 149–62.
26Golitsyna, Remarques sur des événements de ma vie, l. 36.
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wishes to acquire their castles.27  Poles complain bitterly about the high levels of taxation,
but she also observes that serfs are happy with their new ruler: “They have much more
freedom than previously and they have the permission to complain against their lords if
they are overburdened with work and he [the emperor] has emancipated them almost
completely from their masters.”28  She observes that starting from Leopold, the then capital
of Galicia (now the Ukrainian city of Lviv), peasants “look completely different, [they are]
more opulent and less exhausted with work.”29  Although she generally feels corporatist
solidarity with the Polish nobility and seems to regret the partition of Poland, she cannot
help observe that peasants benefit from the policies of Joseph II.  Generally, as she travels
through Austria and then German principalities toward Strasburg, she draws a direct
relationship between the well-being of peasants and the policies of their rulers or masters.
Closer to Strasbourg she writes, “One sees a visible change in the well-being of the peasants,
so this Prince is adored by his subjects.  He seeks every means, even to his own detriment,
to do them good.  The peasants are industrious and good cultivators, even though their land
is not the best, but they know how to take advantage of it.”30  The link she draws here
between wise management and the work ethic of the peasantry implies that it is the
responsibility of the ruler to design incentives to encourage industriousness.  She
demonstrates interest in agricultural techniques, describing in detail how clover is sown to
improve the fertility of the soil, for example.  She seems critical of excessive taxes imposed
on the population.  She imputes the poverty in Southern Alsace to the heavy levies exacted
by the King of France and bemoans the resulting mendicity, which contrasts starkly with
the general opulence on the other side of the border, in the Swiss canton of Basel.31  The
contrast between the two sides of a political border, as well as that between wild nature and
the politeness of the people in the Berner Oberland, lead her to the realization that the
economic situation and moral constitution of the people are not determined by nature, but
by political and religious structures.  She repeatedly highlights the fact that Reformed cantons
in Switzerland are wealthier than Catholic ones, which she blames not only on the survival
of superstitions, but also on the high number of religious festivities and processions, which
“make people lazy,” and on the economic cost of maintaining monasteries, churches, and
priests, siphoning resources away from the people.32  She could have found backing for
these ideas in the Wealth of Nations, but here they seem to derive from personal observation.
Golitsyna’s benevolent attention to the lot of peasants does not mean that she supports
bestowing political rights on the lower classes; indeed, she draws a sharply critical portrait
of direct democracy in central Switzerland.  Nothing could be more chaotic and detrimental
27Golitsyna, Remarques sur mes voyages, l. 7ob.
28Ibid., l. 11.  Inspired by physiocratic principles, Joseph II undertook a series of reforms to put peasants on
a more independent and prosperous footing, first empowering them to complain about abuse on the part of
their lords, and then abolishing the Leibeigenschaft entirely, while forcing nobles to sell peasants’ holdings to
them, if they so wished.  In Galicia, the Leibeigenschaft was abolished in 1782.  Joseph subsequently attempted
to abolish the peasant’s obligation to work three days on behalf of his lord (the robot).  See Derek Beales,
Joseph II, vol. 2, Against the World, 1780–1790 (Cambridge, England, 2009), 251–59.
29Golitsyna, Remarques sur mes voyages, l. 12.
30Ibid., l. 30ob.
31Ibid., l. 39.
32Ibid., l. 54.
116 Andreas Schönle
than the elections of officials, she maintains, as “these limited people, being unable to
discern their true well-being ... do all they can to make the nobility feel their power to enact
their fantasies to the point of insulting them after having chosen them as rulers.”  Her
patriarchal mindset comes across clearly in the description of Catholic peasants, who lack
the education requisite to govern themselves in an ordered and reasoned fashion and instead
succumb to class antagonism, being “impoverished due to the poor use they make of their
freedom.”  Yet she discovers a completely different situation in Protestant Zurich, where
social harmony reigns due to sumptuary laws and the public commitment to education for
all.33  Her account of the first months of the French Revolution is likewise differentiated.
On the one hand, she shuns the street mobs and stays inside for “fear of encountering this
populace,” yet while attending the opening of the Estates-General on May 5, 1789, she
wishes the representatives would strike an agreement “given the total crumbling of finances
and of affairs generally.”34  While she condemns street violence unequivocally, she is also
unsparing toward the failures of government.
Golitsyna reveals herself to be an observant and concerned person, capable of extending
sympathy to people in need, while also firmly keeping an eye on her own interests.  Her
stance is not always consistent and her judgments are often driven by circumstances and by
the company she keeps.  While she sympathizes with the Polish szlachta, which feels
threatened by the policies of Joseph II, she succumbs to the unprepossessing charm of the
Austrian emperor when she meets him.  And similarly, in every country she visits, from
Belgium to England, regardless of what she thinks of public affairs, she is highly partial to
marks of attention the local rulers dispense on her, exemplifying her moral dependence on
signs of monarchic favor.  Upon return to Russia, she seeks to convert the foreign education
of her children and her ties with foreign monarchs and aristocrats into a currency that
enables access, prestige, and high rank in Russia.35  Thus she expertly plays the game of
patronage at court, being all the more determined that she could not rely on her husband to
secure a good position for their children.36
Yet throughout her journey, she displays sustained attention to political structures and
matters of public policy.  She passes judgment on the government of a ruler on the basis of
the well-being of his subjects, including the peasants.  She demonstrates particular interest
in matters of taxation, calling for lower levies on both nobles and peasants.  She firmly
holds that the nobility should enjoy inalienable rights to property.  Although she implies
that serfdom is in itself acceptable, lauding the material condition of Russian serfs, she is
harshly critical of landlords who drive their peasants to destitution.  She also has an eye for
the importance of expenditure to stimulate local economies.  She notes that the austerity of
the Austrian court and army leaves Galicia dependent on the circulation of Russian rubles
33Ibid., ll. 54–56ob.
34Ibid., ll. 89–90.
35F. F. Vigel' commented caustically that “I found out, by the way, that a distinguished family and brilliant
connections not only replace merit and rank ... but stand on a height inaccessible to the latter.  This faith ... was
directly imported from state councilor Princess Natal'ia Petrovna Golitsyna’s suburban residence in St Germain.”
See F. F. Vigel', Zapiski (Moscow, 2000), 49.
36Golitsyna was awarded various orders, which allowed her to overcome the low rank of her deceased husband.
See T. P. Peters, Znakom'tes': Kniaz'ia Golitsyny (Moscow, 2006), 9–13.
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left over from the times of the Russian occupation.37  And in Munich she notes general
discontent with the rule of the Elector (Charles Theodore), who spends elsewhere the taxes
he levies from the local population, thus throwing Bavaria into despondent poverty.38  Finally,
she is a perceptive observer of tensions between social estates and praises political systems
in which social disparities are minimized as a result of public policies, notably in Swiss
Protestant cantons, where she notes with much surprise, but overall praise, that merchants
and artisans assume political functions.39
Although her calls for lower taxation and against economically unproductive
expenditure would have found Smith’s favor, there is no unequivocal evidence in Golitsyna’s
diaries that she read Smith or any other works of political economy.  And indeed, her idea
that court expenditure is important to sustain the economic livelihood of a country would
have earned the scorn of the Scottish economist.  Despite her economic interests, she does
not refer to any political or economic thinker, nor does she indicate that she was reading at
all.  Tellingly, when in 1803 she was thinking of ways to improve the yield of her estates,
she turned for advice to D. M. Poltoratskii, a well-known agricultural “improver,” instead
of drawing on the by then voluminous literature on agricultural reform.40  She relied more
on elite networks than on theoretical literature.  It is rather her experience managing her
estates in the years prior to her departure that prompted her attention to such issues.  It
would thus be futile to seek for specific sources for her ideas.  What is unusual about her is
less the positions she advocates than the fact that they emerge from practical involvement
with estate management and personal comparative observation, rather than from engagement
with economic literature.  Broadly speaking, she remains committed to the patriarchal notion
that people in positions of authority, from rulers to landlords, steer the economy in their
dominion, while assuming a duty of care toward their subjects.  In her political imaginary,
everything in the life of a serf or peasant depends on the wisdom and benevolence of their
ruler.  She does not question their dependency, nor does she envision the possibility, for
example, that peasants could supplement their income as artisans or traders.  It is incumbent
on the landlord to introduce new agricultural techniques and to incentivize the work of
peasants.  Yet she also condones efforts to make dependent people somewhat more self-
reliant by improving their education.  In short, to judge on the basis of her diaries, she
seems to take the duty of care of the landlord seriously, in keeping with Melton’s description
of “enlightened seigniors,” while imagining that landowners thereby discharge a patriotic,
public function.
Upon her return to Russia, Golitsyna continued energetically to manage her estates.
She turned the estate of Gorodnia close to Kaluga into a delightful summer residence,
including a beautiful English park with a pond and greenhouses, and a stately neo-classical
mansion and wings designed by the architect Andrei Voronikhin, A. S. Stroganov’s former
37Golitsyna, Remarques sur mes voyages, l. 10ob.
38Ibid., l. 28ob.
39Ibid., l. 44.
40Poltoratskii told her that no reform would come close to generating the revenue she gets from her
distilleries.  See B. A. Shlikhter and K. A. Maikova, “Arkhiv imeniia Viazemy,” Zapiski otdela rukopisei
Gos. bibliotekia SSSR. im. V. I. Lenina, vol. 17 (Moscow, 1955), 35.
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serf.41  She also continued to develop her lands at Kamarich, in particular the estate of
Radogoshch' in Orlov province, where she similarly developed a garden and even drafted
serfs from other villages to help build stone buildings.
In January 1797, Golitsyna’s serfs at Radogoshch' rebelled against their bailiff, Semen
Svintsov, following the example set by the serfs of the neighboring estate of Brasovo,
which belonged to Stepan Stepanovich Apraksin, Golitsyna’s cousin and son-in-law.  The
ensuing insurrection, which spread throughout the area, became the most significant
peasant unrest since the Pugachev uprising of 1773–75, involving about thirteen thousand
serfs.  The Radogoshch' serfs hastily put together a popular court and sentenced their bailiff
Svintsov and seven other figures to death.  A first confrontation between serfs and official
forces resulted in five deaths among the serfs at Radogoshch' and two on the government’s
side.  On February 13, after several attempts to persuade the serfs to put their arms down
peacefully, the insurgents were finally overcome by a full-fledged military assault on Brasovo,
led by Nikolai Repnin, the distinguished field-marshal and well-known freemason.  Thirty-
four Brasovo serfs were killed during the onslaught, and Golitsyna’s mansion burned down
in the attack on Radogoshch'.  Fierce state repression followed: sixteen leaders of the
insurrection were condemned to one hundred lashes with the knout and a life sentence of
hard labor in Siberia.  Many more received lesser sentences.42
At some point before January 23, Golitsyna’s serfs had addressed a petition to Paul I,
asking to be transferred to the status of state peasants.  In justification, they detailed a
catalogue of complaints against Svintsov, who over more than twenty years had reduced
them to “destitution and oppression.”  Their main complaint was about their work on the
extensive distilleries, which produced more than 1.2 million liters per year of vodka.  The
distilleries required the work of 330 men and operated throughout the year, even at the
peak of field work.  The serfs pointed out that less than half of the vodka production was
delivered to the state, while the rest was illegally sold to local taverns.  Serfs were also
responsible for all transportation related to the distilleries, as well as to the enormous stone
construction undertaken on the estate.  In the famine years of 1787 and 1788, while Golitsyna
was socializing in Paris, Svintsov confiscated all their reserves of grain in order to keep the
distilleries running, giving serfs the distillery waste for their survival.  Svintsov also increased
the size of the lord’s land at the expense of the serfs’ own plots.  The end result of this
systematic abuse and exploitation was that the serf population of Radogoshch' had diminished
by more than half since the 1730s, a loss which, as they put it, “came from no other reason
than the ceaseless day and night work.”  They also noted that fifty men had died in the
cauldrons of the distilleries.  It is clear, if one is to believe the serfs, that Golitsyna’s lifestyle
in Europe and subsequently at court was financed by the brisk exploitation of her serfs,
who provided free labor in her distilleries.43
41A. Trubnikov, “Kniaginia Golitsyna v Mar'ine i Gorodne,” Starye gody (July–September 1910): 164–65.
In the 1820s she commissioned an album of lithographs with views of the mansion and gardens, suggesting the
pride she took in her residence.  See [S. P. Lukin], Sobranie vidov sela Gorodni i ego okrestnostei v semi
verstakh ot Kalugi (N.p., N.d.), available at http://www.raruss.ru/russian-manors/701-lukin-gorodnya.html.
42The story of the insurrection is retold in E. P. Trifil'ev, Ocherki iz istorii krepostnogo prava v Rossii.
Tsarstvovanie imp. Pavla Pervogo (Khar'kov, 1904), 31–55.  Documents relating to it are in S. N. Valk, ed.,
Krest'ianskoe dvizhenie v Rossii v 1796–1825 gg.: Sbornik dokumentov (Moscow, 1961), 107–39.
43Valk, Krest'ianskoe dvizhenie v Rossii, 107–9.
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There is little reason to cast doubt on the serfs’ account.  Their protest was directed
specifically at their treatment and they made it repeatedly clear that they remained faithful
to the tsar, in whose authority they placed all their hopes.  Their petitions were written by
the parish priest Iakov Koloshin, who signed on behalf of the illiterate serfs.44  The local
priest’s endorsement and assistance must have irked Paul I, as in the manifesto he
promulgated in response to the uprising, one reads that “church officials, in particular parish
priests, have the obligation to warn their parishioners against false and harmful
declarations.”45  Nevertheless, even Paul took the complaints seriously and ordered that
Golitsyna and Apraksin be instructed to root out the abuse by their estate managers.46  Finally,
the historian E. P. Trifil'ev quoted official data from a report by the Orlov governor that
corroborate the figures given by the serfs about the production of the distilleries and the
manpower required to run them.47
The extant archive gives little indication of Golitsyna’s response to the uprising.
The family wizened up only slowly to the extent of the destruction and seemed to consider
the mutiny as an unprovoked calamity.  They were most affected by the death of Svintsov,
whom Ekaterina, Golitsyna’s daughter, called her mother’s “true friend.”48  A new bailiff
was appointed for Radogoshch', but the mansion was never reconstructed, suggesting
that Golitsyna did not intend to return to the estate.  Her appetite for agronomical
improvement and for financial profit went on unabated, and she continued to make a
handsome living from the sale of alcohol.  At best, we can say that she turned a blind eye
to the ruthless exploitation of her serfs; at worst that she actively abetted her bailiff.  In
short, between the well-meaning economist keen to observe the treatment of peasants and
serfs in various countries of Europe and the callous estate manager, we end up with a
blatant contradiction.
BORN IN 1772, I. I. Bariatinskii belonged to the upper echelon of the Russian elite and
received a Europeanized education characteristic of the young men of his social standing.
His mother, Princess Ekaterina von Holstein-Beck, descended from the ducal family of
Schleswig-Holstein-Sonderburg-Beck, her father having been the governor of Estonia.
Bariatinskii’s own father, Prince Ivan Sergeevich Bariatinskii, the descendant of a Chernigov
princely family, was Russian ambassador at the court of Louis XVI between 1774 and
1786.  Bariatinskii left Russia in July 1789 with his mother, who embarked on a trip to seek
a cure for her rheumatism.  While she continued her journey, he stayed in Leipzig to study
at the university, before traveling to Geneva, where he was to continue his studies between
late 1790 and 1792, possibly stopping in revolutionary Paris on the way.49  From Geneva he
also traveled to Italy, where his mother was spending much of her time, engrossed primarily
44Ibid., 123.
45Polnoe sobranie zakonov Rossiiskoi imperii (PSZ), Pervoe sobranie, 45 vols. (St. Petersburg, 1830), vol.
24, no. 17769 (January 29, 1797), 305–6.
46Trifil'ev, Ocherki, 39.
47Ibid., 55.
48RGB, f. 64, karton 86, d. 8, l. 10ob.
49In Leipzig, Bariatinskii attended the lectures of Ernst Platner, an eclectic and charismatic scholar who also
drew the attention of Radishchev and Karamzin.  It is not clear what he studied in Geneva.
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in beholding art and visiting artists’ studio.50  We know about Bariatinskii’s political views
and interests from a thick notebook he kept in the years 1790–92 and which he entitled
“The Writings of Prince Ivan Ivanovich Bariatinskii.”51  He embraced the French Revolution
and placed himself among the admirers and supporters of Mirabeau, describing a debate at
the National Assembly.  While in Geneva, itself in the throes of revolutionary fervor, he
wrote a scathing description of the political situation in the Cité de Calvin entitled “Coup
d’oeil at Geneva,” aiming his ire in particular at the local aristocracy, which in his view had
usurped all power in the republic.52  He blames the elite for pursuing its self-interest and
undermining republican institutions.  It is clear from his writings that Bariatinskii conceived
of aristocratic privilege as entailing a responsibility to act in the defense and furtherance of
the common good, and it is this core principle that he sees contravened in the deportment of
the Genevan oligarchy.  His notebook shows him keenly interested in political matters, in
the unfolding of the Revolution, and in legal definitions of freedom, advocating views that
reveal the influence of German natural law.53  At the same time, in line with physiocratic
thinking, he professed economic views that make the land the unique source of wealth of a
nation, writing in an entry called “On the True Wealth of Nations”—possibly a dig at Adam
Smith—that “the land is the unique source of all riches. ... All the rest is notional, of pure
convention, and has no intrinsic value and no other use than to serve as representation of
the effective values.”  Not only does paper or fictive wealth amount to “sterile consumption,”
but it can destroy agricultural production and “exhaust society.”  For noblemen, credit is
nothing but the “tomb of property.”54  Further in the notebook, he drafts the plan of a book
on Russia’s economic resources, which contains lofty expectations about its future
contribution to Europe.  He calls Russia “a second Europe” (he probably has in mind
considerations of size) and intends to emphasize “the important role his country has always
played.”  Russia, to him, “possesses everything which can facilitate the progress of
commerce,” and the main task is to foster agriculture, “which has always been considered
as the principal and true source of Russia’s treasures.”55  He thinks that Russia merely
needs population growth and better communications, notably by “developing waterways to
facilitate commercial exchanges.”56  It is clear from these writings that, despite his interest
in natural law and in republican government, he identified himself as a Russian patriot and
was keen to emphasize Russia’s political and economic might.
50See her interesting  travel diary, Bariatinskaia Ekaterina Petrovna, ur. Golshtein-Bek, Zapiski o puteshestvii
po Evrope, RGB, f. 19, op. 5/2, d. 12.
51I. I. Bariatinskii, Ecrits du Prince Ivan Ivanowitch Bariatinsky, Chernoviki, zapiski, zametki, rassuzhdeniia
I. I. Bariatinskogo, RGB, f. 19, op. 2, papka 253, d. 1.
52For Bariatinskii’s views on Geneva and his approach to natural law, along with a publication of this text,
see my “Aristocratic Subjectivity in Revolutionary Turmoil: I. I. Bariatinskii’s ‘Coup d’oeil sur Genève’ (1791),”
Cahiers du monde russe 57:4 (2017): 1–31.
53Bariatinskii’s notebook contains a twenty-page inset, “Droit naturel: Système de Mr Platner,” which appears
to represent his lecture notes from Leipzig (RGB, f. 19, op. 2, papka 253, d. 1, ll. 13–33).
54Bariatinskii, Sur la vraie richesse des nations, ibid., l. 59.
55Ibid., ll. 84ob.–85.
56After inheriting the estate of Ivanovskoe (Mar'ino), Bariatinskii tried to open up the local river for navigation
and transportation and was incensed by the resistance put up by his neighbors.  One has to “follow common,
not private, interest, as is customary here,” he wrote angrily to his chargé d’affaires (and former minister of
finances) F. A. Golubtsov (RGB, f. 19, op. 1, papka 154, l. 30).
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In late 1792, Bariatinskii prepared a notebook entitled “Recollections of Italy and
Geneva, Year 1792.”  This volume features a clean copy of his “Coup d’oeil at Geneva,” as
well as a longer text entitled “Reflections on Italy,” which runs to about thirty pages and
contains two drawings of street scenes.57  This text, written in French, provides a sharply
critical view of the contemporary political, economic, legal, and moral condition of Italy.
It takes up a broad series of issues, ranging from the corruption of criminal jurisprudence to
the power of religion, from the pernicious influence of charity to the survival of a few
ancient Roman virtues among the people.  Bariatinskii starts his analysis by detailing the
pernicious effects of the dismemberment of Italy into small principalities, which stifles its
national identity.  He speaks of a “feudal anarchy” in which aristocrats compete among
themselves to attract clients to their little despotic dominion, notably by providing safe
harbor to criminals and by maintaining an army of beggars.  As a result, justice becomes
venal, so that murders are considered routine and trivial offenses.  Even the sbirri, who
should protect the public order, engage in their own criminal dealings, often in collusion
with aristocrats.  Bariatinskii does not mince his words about the result of this moral and
legal degradation: Italians are “the most villainous people on earth.”58
Another aspect of the Italians’ debasement is the influence of religion, and here
Bariatinskii’s critique rejoins Golitsyna’s views on Catholicism.  The survival of superstitions
and the commanding power of the Pope mean that legitimate political actions, such as
rebellion on account of price rises for staples, are easily stamped out.  Bariatinskii writes of
the “despotic power which religion exercises over the spirit of the nation.”  Religion also
encourages charity, idleness, and lack of productivity, while hindering population growth.
Enormous waste of resources results from the fact that “priests, murderers, prostitutes and
beggars, these are three quarters of the population.”59
The moral degradation of Italians, which undermines the political economy of the
country, is attributable to a “monstrous inequality in the distribution of wealth” in the country,
which creates only “discouragement, laziness, sterile envy, and crime.”  The numerous
beggars who are maintained by wealthy princes encourage sloth and destroy manufacturing,
as they “earn” as much as an artisan, albeit with less effort, which deflects manpower from
industry.  If there is no happiness in Italy (the happiness of the people being a government’s
highest badge of legitimacy according to German natural law), it is ultimately because
there is no “individual security” in the absence of a functioning and fair legal system.60
Bariatinskii is highly critical of the state of agriculture, which is “entirely neglected in
Italy.”  While nature is so fertile that it feeds Italians despite their indolence, Italy would be
among Europe’s most formidable nations were its agriculture equal to the fertility of its
climate.  The Pope is particularly remiss in failing “to govern the political economy of his
state as he governs the spirit of his subjects.”  Due to the “languishing population, multitude
57I. I. Bariatinskii, Souvenirs d’Italie et de Genève, année 1792 (incorporating “Coup d’oeil sur Genève”
and “Relfexions sur l’Italie”), Gosudarstvennyi istoricheskii muzei, Otdel pis'mennykh istochnikov, f. 342,
op. 1, d. 202.
58Ibid., l. 12ob.
59Ibid., ll. 15ob. and 8ob., respectively.
60Ibid., ll. 27–27ob.
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of church persons, the monopoly of wheat and the Roman cult, which takes too much time
away from work,” he extracts from his domains less than half their potential yield.61  In
Sicily, despite the extraordinary fertility of the climate, agricultural productivity, discouraged
by heavy taxes on exports, is so low that the population has declined in comparison with
Roman times.  Three quarters of the population do not work at all, as in Sicily there are 368
noble families and 80,000 churchmen.  And trade in Italy is also hampered, notably by state
monopolies on the sale of basic staples and by insane taxation, for example the bread tax,
which in many cities is determined by committees of nobles.62
Bariatinskii’s attacks on state monopolies and on fiscal interference in trade align him
with the Physiocrats’ idea of “laissez-faire.”63  His concern for massively unproductive
government activities, notably in ecclesiastical lands, makes him likewise compatible with
Adam Smith in his emphasis on productivity as the main factor of economic development.
And in linking greater efficiency with population growth, Bariatinskii encapsulates the two
main engines of wealth creation in Smith.  Nevertheless, it is not certain that Bariatinskii is
influenced by The Wealth of Nations.  His concern is primarily with agriculture, and his
apodictic mantra that “agriculture is the true wealth of nations, in front of which all others
are artificial and impermanent,” makes him a committed physiocrat and contradicts Smith.64
He has little to say about such key Smithian concepts as the division of labor, mechanization,
the importance of capital, the value added from manufacturing, and so on.  Nor does
Bariatinskii speak the language of self-interest explicitly.  As we saw briefly in his analysis
of the demise of the Geneva republic, Bariatinskii espouses the rhetoric of public duty,
rather than private interest.  He is, however, in agreement with Smith when he describes at
length how the absence of a fair administration of justice, which robs individuals of the
security of their bodies and possessions, saps the wealth of the nation.65  And he also echoes
Smith when he calls on nobles to invest in public works in their lands, for example by
creating irrigation systems.66  Ultimately, his analysis of the travails of Italian principalities
amounts to an extension of his critique of the aristocracy as an estate, which he had already
adumbrated in his “Coup d’oeil at Geneva.”  It is the self-serving despotic excesses of the
rulers of Italian principalities, whose rule “can be compared to a Turkish government,” that
have dismembered the collective body of the nation.67
To what extent does this critique of the “feudal anarchy” created by “the excessive
authority of nobles” also serve as a foil to reflect on the legitimacy of the Russian nobility?
Bariatinskii was equally savage in his disdain of the Russian aristocracy: “The character of
Russians is fake.  Intrigue is their element.  Low and groveling, proud and haughty, true
chameleons, they are capable of anything and suitable to nothing.  Russians all resemble
61Ibid., ll. 32–34.
62Ibid., ll. 36ob.–37.
63My analysis here focuses on the economic principles underpinning Bariatinskii’s description of Italy,
rather than on the sources for his comments on Italian affairs, which is a separate topic that cannot be addressed
here for lack of space.
64Bariatinskii, Souvenirs d’Italie, l. 32.
65Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, ed. R. H. Campbell and A.
S. Skinner (Indianapolis, 1981), 663–88.
66Bariatinskii, Souvenirs d’Italie, ll. 32–33ob.
67Ibid., l. 8.
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one another, not because they have a national character, but because they all imitate.”68
Following his European studies, Bariatinskii embarked on a career in the diplomatic service,
which to be sure involved a lot of “imitation.”  However, in 1812, as he inherited his
parents’ estates upon their death, he promptly retired from civil service and began stylizing
himself as an agronomist, attempting to improve agriculture on his estate of Mar'ino in
Kursk province.69  More importantly, he built an opulent mansion and stately gardens,
which pushed him into serious debt and took a severe toll on his serfs.70  Nevertheless, as he
received reports of their destitution, he sought ways to alleviate their lot, distributing grain,
horses, and sheep.71  Agricultural improvement, to him, meant primarily the introduction of
new seeds, techniques, and machines.  Although he received a medal from the Free Economic
Society for his efforts in draining marshes, he was unsuccessful in changing the traditional
system of field rotation.  In stark contradiction with his physiocratic convictions, he never
questioned the basic institutions underpinning Russian agriculture, notably serfdom and in
particular the corvée, which he deemed indispensable to reforming the moral character of
Russian serfs.
Bariatinskii was as concerned to affirm his social eminence as he was to improve the
life of those in his care.  Indeed, he hoped that his pursuit of agricultural productivity would
enable him both to enhance his prestige and to better the lot of his serfs.  He argued that
agricultural reform was more valuable a service to the state than careers in St. Petersburg,
and in his views on the centrality of agriculture to the nation and on the pernicious nature of
debt, he remained a physiocrat in thought, if not in deed.  By the end of his life he confessed
to his son in his will that he was ashamed of his debts and of the excessive luxury he had
indulged in designing his estate life.  He found in agricultural improvement a discourse that
accommodated the revolutionary zeal of his youth, while also allowing his pursuit of
aristocratic distinction.  But it is not clear that the path he cut out in life was so fundamentally
different from that of an Italian duke, at least in the sense that he did little to diminish
disparities in the distribution of wealth on his estate or to give security of body and property
to his serfs.  The republican ideas he absorbed in his youth, which emphasized patriotic
commitment to the common good, rephrased as patriarchal care for his serfs, prevented
him from recognizing or accepting the liberal linkage between self-interest and
industriousness.  Increasingly, he resorted to coercive means of control, threatening to punish
68Bariatinskii, Ecrits, l. 101.  This passage is clearly inspired by Rousseau’s critique of Petrine Westernization
in the Contrat Social (bk. 2, chap. 8).  Bariatinskii subsequently also refers to Raynal’s treatment of Russia in
his Histoire philosophique et politique.  This passage and its continuation evidently refer to the Westernized
nobility.
69It is worth noting that as he developed an interest for agronomy in 1812, Bariatinskii wrote first to Charles
Pictet de Rochemont in Geneva and then corresponded with other famous European agricultural improvers.
He joined the Free Economic Society only in 1819, when he settled on his estate.  While estate reconstruction
took place, that is between 1812 and 1819, he stayed in Germany and there is no evidence that he read Russian
agronomical or economic literature.
70A detailed analysis of Bariatinskii’s estate transformation and agricultural reforms can be found in my
“Self-fashioning, Agricultural Improvement, and Enlightenment Practice: I. I. Bariatinskii’s Reforms of the
Country Estate,” in The Europeanized Elite in Russia, 1762–1825: Public Role and Subjective Self, ed. Andreas
Schönle et al. (DeKalb, 2016), 136–54.
71Although the peasants were complaining, there is no evidence in the archive that they went so far as
to rebel.
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lazy or wayward serfs with work on the pond dig or in his factories.72  Thus republican
rhetoric of patriotic commitment turned into a legitimization of a paternalistic and
authoritarian exercise of power, contradicting the premise of laissez-faire at the heart of
both physiocratic and Smithian economics.
A. M. BAKUNIN, born 1768, the father of the anarchist, was a nobleman of ancient middling
stock.  He received a thorough education, most of it in Italy, where he was sent at the age of
nine.73  In 1783 he started working as a clerk and then translator for the College of Foreign
Affairs, while continuing his studies of natural history and, in 1789, defending a doctoral
dissertation written in Latin at the University of Padua.  With his knowledge of foreign
languages he was destined for a brilliant career in the diplomatic service, but in 1791, at his
mother’s request, he retired from service with the rank of court councilor—the seventh on
the Table of Ranks—to assume the management of the family estate at Priamukhino in
Tver' province and redress the family finances.74  Bakunin wrote poetry, letters, diaries,
economic blueprints, as well as legal contracts, thus leaving behind a rich archive.
In a short text written around 1808 under the title of “Thoughts on the Beginning and
Well-Being of Societies,” Bakunin developed his version of the stadial history of humankind
then current among Scottish Enlighteners and French Physiocrats.  This historical
metanarrative provides a teleological account of human perfectibility, which unfolds through
four stages of development—hunting, pasturage, agriculture, and commerce—causally
leading from one to the next.  The text starts with the premise that human beings are naturally
sociable, thus opposing both Rousseau and Hobbes.  Family is the original social formation.
As population grows, hunting stops being a reliable means of survival, so humans are
compelled to domesticate animals.  At this stage, to defend their cattle, they discover the
need for property and also for assembling within larger groupings for the purpose of self-
defense, leading to the emergence of personal property and some form of social organization.
The rise of agriculture, the third stage, responds to the growing scarcity of available land
and the need to find more intense forms of land use.  Here ownership of land takes hold.
And finally, the stage of commerce dawns when agriculture produces a surplus.  At each
stage of this materialist history, Bakunin highlights the institutional and moral consequences
attendant on economic development.  Thus with the rise of agriculture we witness the
development of morality: “peaceful but steady pleasures take the place of violent and short-
lived passions; plunder became a crime, noble inclinations arose; the strength of family,
friendship, and love transformed the love for personal independence into collective love
for the fatherland.”75  Stadial history is crucial to Bakunin’s political economy, not only
because it underpins his deterministic premise that institutional factors shape the moral
72RGB, f. 19, op. 1, papka 231, ed. khr. y, l. 8.
73Randolph, House in the Garden, 48–81.  See also Vladimir Sysoev, Bakuniny (Tver', 2002); and A. A.
Kornilov, Molodye gody M. Bakunina: Iz istorii russkogo romantizma (Moscow, 1915).
74In 1792 the Bakunin family’s debt amounted to 53,000 rubles (Institut russkoi literatury [IRLI], f. 16, op.
4, d. 37, l. 2).  By 1804, the family still owed 36,000 rubles, and 685 out of their 837 serfs were pledged as
collateral on the debt (Sysoev, Bakuniny, 71).
75A. M. Bakunin, “Mysli o nachale i blagosostoianii obshchestva,” Tetradi s zapisiami Bakunina,
Gosudarstvennyi arkhiv Rossiiskoi Federatsii (GARF), f. 825, op. 1, d. 259, l. 59ob.
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profile of human beings, but also because it delineates a narrative of civilizational progress,
within which he inscribes his own efforts.  His conviction is that institutional changes lead
to moral improvements and thus that agricultural reform can be a form of moral engineering.
It is difficult to ascertain exactly where Bakunin might have obtained these ideas.  His
views come closest to Adam Smith’s philosophy, although in the Wealth of Nations stadial
history is assumed but not treated systematically.  A more complete exposition could be
found in Smith’s Lectures on Jurisprudence, which were, however, not available to
Bakunin.76  Nevertheless, there are other traces of possible Smithian influence in his writings,
either directly or indirectly: in a text we will analyze more closely below, for example, he
calls for freeing international grain trade and maintains that “the price of bread is a valuation
of labor,” both ideas central to the Wealth of Nations, the latter being distinctly Smithian.77
Other versions of stadial history that Bakunin might have read (A. R. J. Turgot, Adam
Ferguson, John Millar, Condorcet) delineate different evolutionary narratives.78
Bakunin’s deterministic view of the stages of history leads to an emphasis on institutional
change as the precondition for civilizational progress.  In a letter to A. N. Olenin of 1803 he
argues pragmatically that it is not ideas that bring enlightenment, but structural
transformations.  His main point is that enlightenment is not measured by the spread of
knowledge and science, but by the well-being of the people, polemicizing with Karamzin,
who at the time was promoting popular education in the pages of Vestnik Evropy.79  New
ideas hardly help destitute people, nor does knowledge in itself strengthen reason and moral
character.80  Even Fenelon’s much-admired The Adventures of Telemachus, the Son of Ulysses
(1699) is powerless to influence human behavior, as it assumes disinterestedness, which
does not exist in nature.81  In a six-point plan Bakunin highlights issues such as reforms of
the legal system to protect justice from slander; changes to religious practice to distinguish
truth from superstition and morality from kowtowing (poklony); sowing the seeds of
industriousness to transform “the fetid currents of state and national prosperity into clean
and inexhaustible springs”; the promulgation of clear laws to “differentiate between property
and seizure, between rights and violence”; the revival of science, the arts, commerce, and
76Desnitsii delivered a lecture in 1781, published soon after, which discussed property in the four stages of
development.  His lecture is available in S. A. Pokrovskii, ed., Iuridicheskie proizvedeniia progressivnykh
russkikh myslitelei (Moscow, 1959), 242–58.  It is only superficially similar to Bakunin’s theory.  On the rise
of stadial theory see Ronald L. Meek, Social Science and the Ignoble Savage (Cambridge, England, 1976).
For a discussion of the chronological appearance of various instances of stadial history see Ronald L. Meek,
“Smith, Turgot, and the ‘Four Stages’ Theory,” History of Political Economy 3:1 (1971): 9–27.
77A. M. Bakunin, “Usloviia pomeshchika s krest'ianinom,” in L. G. Agamalian, “A. M. Bakunin i ego proekt
‘Uslovie pomeshchika s krest'ianinom,’” in Pamiatniki kul'tury. Novye otkrytiia. Pis'mennost'. Iskusstvo.
Arkheologiia. 1998 (Moscow, 1999), 64.
78The catalogue of Bakunin’s library (established after 1842) has only two foreign works on agronomy and
economy, namely an essay on crop rotation by the Genevan Pictet de Rochemont (a topic of great interest to
Bakunin) and Il Piantatore by Ignazio Ronconi.  The list of Russian-language works is no more illuminating,
except that it includes the Russian translation of Hirzel’s The Rural Socrates, which, however, is diametrically
opposed to Bakunin’s philosophy (IRLI, f. 16, op. 6, d. 36).
79Rossiiskaia natsional'naia biblioteka, Otdel rukopisei (RNB), f. 542, op. 1, d. 168, l. 2.  For a brief discussion
of this letter see L. G. Agamalian, “A. M. Bakunin: Vozvrashchenie v Rossiiu,” http://anthropology.ru/ru/texts/
agamalyan/ruseur_26.html.
80RNB, f. 542, op. 1, d. 168, l. 4.
81Ibid., l. 5.
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popular industry; and, finally, rules to clarify the respective rights and responsibilities of
the rulers and the ruled, in order, and this is the critical phrase, “to create man” (sotvorit'
cheloveka).82  To him the Enlightenment means not a body of thought, but a set of structural
improvements, mostly by way of legal and economic reforms, that create a law-based society
and guarantee the security of individuals and their property and thereby shore up the humanity
of humans, or, in other words, enable their moral autonomy and personal initiative.
In keeping with these views, Bakunin explored ways serfdom could be reformed.  In
1802 he prepared the project of a contract between landowner and serfs, which he sent for
consultation to Olenin, who was then state secretary in the Ministry of Internal Affairs.83
The project was never returned to its author and, in any case, stood no chance of seeing
implementation.  The contract is written on behalf of a notional landowner called Ivan
Dobrokhotov (Ivan Well-Wisher) and a serf named Miron, suggesting that it belongs more
to the genre of didactic literature (where such names are common), than revealing Bakunin’s
actual legal intentions.84  In it Bakunin carefully explains the benefits of each provision for
the landowner, the agriculturalist (zemledelets), and society, as well as establishes its
conformity with the law, taking Catherine’s 1767 Nakaz as legal basis (even though it had
no force of law).  The primary idea of this project is the consolidation of land into plots of
fifteen desiatina (roughly forty acres), to which each serf head of household would be
given hereditary title in exchange for discharging a certain number of obligations, such as
ceding to the landlord a third of the proceeds of the land, as well as planting potatoes,
hedges, orchards, and keeping bees.  For the landowner, granting property to serfs will
bring the benefit of vouchsafing his own much larger property and increasing his revenue.85
For the serfs, the benefit of owning property lies in the opportunity to make long-term
improvements to the land and enhance its yield, acting on their natural self-interest: “Can
one be a good peasant, if one does not know what is one’s own?  The harvest depends on
industry, and industry on inviolability.”  For society, the benefit is also a better management
of the soil: “Just like dissolute women rarely have children, so the soil, moving from hand
to hand, remains barren.  In our economy, we have retained the spirit of nomadic peoples.”86
In later notes to his contract, Bakunin argues that as they receive property rights, serfs will
develop a completely transformed moral make-up.  If his current muzhiki are in the habit of
pilfering at the first opportunity, in the future, he maintains, “we won’t have muzhiki, but
zemledel'tsy who will embellish their property and as they take care of their own land, will
begin to respect the property of others.”87  In the initial version, Bakunin puts it more
conceptually: “By acquiring means toward a comfortable subsistence, the knowledge of his
obligations, and confidence that there won’t be any new impositions, [the agriculturalist] at
82Ibid., ll. 9–10.
83Bakunin, “Usloviia pomeshchika,” 63–71.  In 1810, having never received his contract back, Bakunin
copied a somewhat different version in his notebook, suggesting that he still cared for it (GARF, f. 825, op. 1,
d. 259, ll. 49ob.–55).
84Randolph offers a more detailed discussion of the contract than can be accommodated here (House in the
Garden, 73–79).
85Perhaps Bakunin hints here at the landowners’ perennial fear of peasant mutiny (“Usloviia  pomeshchika,”
63).
86Ibid.
87GARF, f. 825, op. 1, d. 259, l. 52ob.
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the same time acquires humanity and citizenship.”88  In other words, in keeping with his
stadial history, Bakunin charts the transformation from a nomadic mindset to that of settled,
hard-working, law-abiding citizenship, a transformation that also brings aesthetic benefits.
Serfs would in effect progress to the next historical stage.
Bakunin’s contract also envisions fundamental changes in the master’s relationship
with his serfs.  The master commits not to sell serfs, nor to interfere with their marriage,
although in a paternalistic way he reserves the right to prevent forced marriages as well as
marriages between people of dissimilar age.  He will not require marriage prior to age
eighteen, though will demand financial compensation for loss of earning if young people
do not marry after that age.  Crucially, Bakunin stops short of liberating the serfs fully;
indeed, there are onerous provisions should a serf want to purchase his emancipation.89  He
merely seeks to grant serfs a degree of economic and moral autonomy, in order to generate
at once greater efficiency, prosperity, probity, and aesthetic amenity.
Bakunin prepared this contract precisely at the time when the Unofficial Committee
and the Permanent Council were discussing a draft edict initiated by S.  P.  Rumiantsev on
the emancipation of serfs.90  It transpires from a crossed-out section of a letter from Olenin
to an unknown official that this official had requested a copy of Bakunin’s contract.91  Olenin
complied with the request, but demanded that in accordance with the author’s wishes this
copy be not disseminated further.  He also made profuse apologies for the “incorrect and at
times daring style” of the author, which he attributed to the “enthusiasm, with which he saw
future times and longed-for images of universal peace and prosperity.”92  It is thus clear that
Bakunin shared this contract with Olenin mostly to solicit advice, but not (or at any rate not
yet) to obtain official endorsement for his plan, and only reluctantly, if at all, to weigh in on
the legislative process.  And in fact, his intentions are fundamentally at variance with the
ensuing Edict on Free Agriculturalists, which was promulgated on February 20, 1803.  The
edict combined the possibility of emancipating serfs (at their owners’ discretion, which
was already legally permissible) with the conveyance of land property to them, at conditions
that are agreed between the landowner and the serfs and approved by the tsar.  The novelty
of the edict was in creating a de facto new class of people, free farmers, who owned the
land they tilled, although they remained tied to their former masters by certain conditions.93
88Bakunin, “Usloviia pomeshchika,” 65.
89They have to compensate their master financially by an amount equivalent to his revenue, yet he would
nevertheless retain the land (Bakunin, “Usloviia pomeshchika,” 70).  Agamalian, who published this document,
misunderstands Bakunin’s intentions when she states that it “presupposes the emancipation of serfs with land”
(“A. M. Bakunin i ego proekt,” 58).
90For an excellent analysis of debates about serfdom during the reign of Alexander I see Susan P. McCaffray,
“Confronting Serfdom in the Age of Revolution: Projects for Serf Reform in the Time of Alexander I,” Russian
Review 64 (January 2005): 1–21.
91RNB, f. 542, op. 1, d. 76, l. 1.  Agamalian did not publish this crossed-out section, but it is important for
an understanding of the circulation of Bakunin’s contract.  It contradicts Agamalian’s thesis, tentatively endorsed
by Randolph, that the “Uslovie” was intended by Bakunin to serve as a model for the edict under discussion
(Randolph, House in the Garden, 71–74).  Bakunin drew patriotic pride from imagining that he acted by
setting an example, but he consistently rejected any official roles offered to him.
92Agamalian, “A. M. Bakunin i ego proekt,” 72.
93The most complete analysis of the outcome of this decree is still Semevskii, Krest'ianskii vopros v Rossii,
252–81.
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Bakunin had no intention of emancipating his serfs.  Instead, he merely wanted to confer
ownership of the land to them, as a way to provide them with an incentive to develop habits
of industriousness.  Bakunin’s project was incompatible with Russian law in that only free
people were then entitled to own land.94  It also contradicted agricultural practice in serf
communes, where the rotation of land among families and the use of unfenced communal
lands was the norm.95  There is a fundamental contradiction at the heart of his project in that
on the one hand it envisioned property as the source of moral regeneration and autonomy,
yet on the other it subjected serfs to a host of rather detailed impositions in perpetuity.  It is
thus not entirely surprising that it was never implemented.
This unexecuted contract of 1802 was not Bakunin’s last word on the subject of
economic reform.  In 1813 he developed a new, more modest and realistic project, which
envisioned giving serfs not only fields to cultivate on quit-rent, but also meadows for hay,
so that they could keep their own cattle and thereby fertilize the fields entrusted to their
care.  Again the underlying intent was to give serfs more autonomy and to foster structures
based on mutual self-interest: “In my view,” Bakunin put it in his typical hard-nosed way,
“only that economic system is good which harnesses the interest of the owner to that of the
farmers.”96  Furthermore, mutual self-interest would lay the conditions for shared agricultural
experiments such as the introduction of mills, cheese dairies, textile factories, and distilleries.
Complicated calculations demonstrated that with the use of meadows, serfs could be expected
to hand in a quarter of the yield to the landowner, rather than the customary fifth, and still
be better off.  Altogether, including the factories, Bakunin reckoned that he could fetch
forty thousand rubles per year, while his peasants would receive eighty thousand.
Yet just as he reaches this hopeful conclusion comes the characteristic acknowledgment
that this plan is nothing but a pipedream that will never come to pass:
Having read this, some will consider me insane, others will call me an idle
planner.  The more sensible will ask me why I do not implement my plan: 1)
because in the first years one cannot expect great income as every beginning is
difficult; 2) because I’m not the master; 3) because it is customary from old
days that there are plenty of idle house serfs; 4) because peasants and those
who work against their will toil as little and poorly as possible; 5) because
there is no capital and there is no way to obtain any in the current order of
things; 6) because etc. etc. etc.97
Curiously, while concocting his detailed plans, Bakunin remained fully aware that his ideas
would remain just that, as they ran against current economic, legal, social, and moral realities.
How could he at the same time map out avenues of social and economic reform while
harboring such pessimistic views about their implementation?  Is Bakunin an early-day
Oblomov?
94However, his project is similar to the extra-legal agreements that were struck between owners and serfs on
the Sheremetev estates (Dennison, Institutional Framework, 132–48).
95Confino, Systèmes agraires et progrès agricole, 271–340.
96IA. M. Bakunin, untitled project, IRLI, f. 16, op. 2, d. 7, l. 14.
97Ibid., l. 22ob.  Priamukhino belonged to Bakunin’s mother until her death in 1814.
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WHAT, THEN, was the effect of political economy on the identity and lifestyle of the three
nobles we considered here?  In all three instances, the promise of progressive reform inherent
in their interest in political economy was defeated in practice, and spectacularly so in
Golitsyna’s case.  Is this to say that political economy was no more than ideological window
dressing?  Or was it just a youthful fantasy?  This would be overly reductive, even though
all three became more conservative over the years.  Their interest in political economy
reflects an aspiration to live a mindful existence and to fashion their identity in ways that at
once reflect their values, but also achieve social recognition.  Golitsyna seems to have been
the least animated by public concerns, but Bariatinskii and Bakunin clearly framed their
thoughts and actions as a form of patriotic service, which they discharged primarily by
setting an example of what they saw as enlightened estate management, although not so far
as to harm their self-interest.
In reflecting on their position in economic language, they encountered both objective
obstacles and subjective contradictions.  Both Bariatinskii and Bakunin became self-critical,
impatient at their own failures to live according to their better selves.  The archival record
for Golitsyna is slimmer and less definitive in this regard, although her imperious public
manner in her later years suggests no lack of self-confidence.  The least we could say about
the impact of political economy is that it created both objective and subjective tensions as
it exacerbated contradictions between patriotic aspirations, social norms, the pursuit of
economic rationality, psychological longing for autonomy, and moral concern for serfs.
None of my protagonists managed to reconcile their paternalistic and patriarchal identity
as serf owners with the emerging notion that only self-interest and the security of property
can truly incentivize productive economic behavior.  Bakunin went the furthest in this
regard, incorporating the transition from the nefarious habits of dependency to the self-
governing virtues of economic independence into a narrative of stadial evolution, but the
reform plans he carefully hatched in accordance with these ideas crashed against the realities
of his own precarious finances and the legal parameters of his society.
Nevertheless, political economy encouraged behavior that was unconventional by the
norms of the times.  Golitsyna’s determined pursuit of social prestige and economic profit
served in part to compensate for the social ineptness of her husband and may have stretched
gender conventions.  She was also idiosyncratic in that she eschewed the habits of ostentatious
consumption.  According to contemporary accounts, the lifestyle she led in St. Petersburg
upon her return was hardly luxurious and her receptions were frugal at best, which in no
way hurt her social standing.  In contrast, Bariatinskii felt it necessary to assume the trappings
of luxury, although he was scathing about his social peers (whom he thought to impress
with his display of wealth) and militant about serving his country in an unconventional
capacity as agricultural “improver.”  To retire from service in 1812, just as Napoleon was
readying to invade Russia, was highly unorthodox.  Bakunin, too, declined several offers to
hold public service, preferring to devote his energy to transforming his estate and creating
a domestic idyll on the margins of society, but as a form of patriotic experiment.
It is perhaps testament to the gap between the worldview implicit in Western political
economy and social and economic realities in Russia that of the three, it is only Golitsyna,
the least committed to acting on its precepts, who was economically successful.  Neither
Bariatinskii nor Bakunin could quite overcome their indebtedness, despite their best
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intentions.  But at least they felt their debts to be a blot on their conscience, contradicting
the received view of the upper nobility as a blithely improvident and profligate class.98  In
some instances, the impact of political economy trickled down to their descendants.  Sofia
Stroganova, Golitsyna’s daughter, became herself a noted agricultural “improver” who
inherited and successfully managed the vast Stroganov estates in Siberia, introducing a
series of innovative institutions to protect the serfs and founding two agronomical schools.99
And Mikhail Bakunin became the famous anarchist who put property ownership at the
heart of his sociological analysis.  While less than transformative, the early reception of
political economy by the noble elite unsettled their subjective world, putting into motion a
process that eventually led to a fundamental questioning of the moral aspects of property
(and serf) ownership.
98Jerome Blum, Lord and Peasant in Russia from the Ninth to the Nineteenth Century (Princeton, 1961),
379–85.
99Russkii biograficheskii slovar', 25 vols. (St. Petersburg, 1896–1918), 19:477–80.
